

A Word from the Chairman



In 1945, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, then chief of staff of the U.S. Army, pondered the bitter lessons of joint operations from World War II and the price paid in blood of parochialism in the services and a lack of joint doctrine. He argued that “separate ground, air, and sea warfare is gone forever.” Such ideas, although deemed “revolutionary, dangerous, and unnecessary” during the organizational battles that raged after the war, resulted in the formation of the Department of Defense in 1947.

From the National Security Act of 1947 to the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, we have traveled a long, hard road. Nonetheless, we have made considerable progress in acquiring, sustaining, and refining the capability to conduct joint and combined operations. Even in the Persian Gulf significant interservice problems emerged: fratricide, difficulties in intelligence diffusion, incompatible communication links, limited airlift and sealift capabilities, the development and dissemination of air tasking orders, and logistical problems. As in the past, however, we were able to resolve most of these and other issues during a lengthy period of preparation prior to the campaign. In the future, we cannot count on the factor of time to resolve joint concerns. We must be ready to execute a CINC's war plan with little or no notice.

Today we face some interesting paradoxes. On one hand the end of the Cold War enabled us to reduce forces and budgets by about 35 percent. On the other we have conducted some forty joint operations in recent years—to preserve the dignity of peoples in the face of savage tragedies, evacuate innocent citizens, crush illegal drug activities, and

help failing states. The Armed Forces have performed superbly in every operation despite arduous demands on them and their families. In addition, a quantum leap in joint doctrine—with 63 publications completed and another 35 on the way—has improved joint operations and training exercises. As in the past, many of our best joint efforts have been a product of cooperation among artful commanders after an operation has begun. That cooperation must continue, but we must be more proactive in providing the fabric of jointness before an operation begins.

A second paradox involves strategic and budget realities. Today's force will compete with tomorrow's. We must continue to refine critical operational aspects of joint operations and sustain a high level of readiness. Training, exercises, education, and even quality of life are fundamental to day-to-day readiness. At the same time, for the future, we must also devote greater resources to force modernization to take advantage of new technologies and replace aging equipment. We need readiness and modernization to successfully accomplish missions at minimal cost of lives.

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Historically, great leaders such as Eisenhower and Marshall have seen improved jointness as a means of dealing with similar paradoxes. The information age has magnified this reality. For example, many improved C⁴I systems have no single-service parent. Moreover, information age technologies offer the possibility for weapons and

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other systems that will meet the requirements of all or many of the services and warfighting CINCs.

Clearly efforts to achieve a common direction and high levels of jointness must continue. Today we are institutionalizing the spirit of that endeavor. And that is the process we have begun over the past several years by developing joint doctrine, strengthening joint training and exercises, embedding jointness into force planning and materiel development processes, adding new facilities such as the Joint Warfighting Center, and continuing to refine interaction with warfighting CINCs. We have come a long way since the Goldwater-Nichols Act, but we have some distance to go.

Scripture tells us that "Where there is no vision, the people perish," and that is just as true today. A joint, long-term vision—shared by all services and unified CINCs—is essential if we are to retain a viable national security into the uncertain environment of the next century. We had long-range assessments in the past, but out of necessity we designed and sized forces primarily for one worst case, threat-based scenario: global war with the Soviet Union. Yet with the massive changes that followed the end of the Cold War we found it necessary to focus almost exclusively on short- and mid-range modifications to Cold War force structure. This process resulted in the Base Force and the Bottom-Up Review. The latter provided a "sizing scenario" for designing force structure absent a clear threat.

Today, for example, we are sized to meet two major regional contingencies (MRC). These scenarios are only mid-term markers that helped build, manage, and sustain our forces. Today, it is clear that we need a long-term vision to focus our efforts. The Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces agreed and recommended that JCS "propose a unified vision for joint operations . . . to guide force and materiel development, integrate support to CINCs, improve joint doc-

trine development, develop and monitor joint readiness standards, and increase emphasis on joint training." Thus, to remain dominant in the future we will need a mark on the wall to help us develop the requisite warfighting capabilities to deter or defeat any threat that emerges.

JV 2010 is that mark on the wall. It is the conceptual template for how the Armed Forces will channel the vitality and innovation of our people and leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting into the 21st century. It will help us leverage our strengths, especially quality people and technology, to create a force with capabilities to dominate any battlefield across a full spectrum of threats. *JV 2010* will also provide a measure of merit for evaluating innovations which have the potential to support our vision.

JV 2010 is the result of two years of thought and hard work by the CINCs, services, and Joint

Staff. We have a long history of multiservice initiatives, interservice rivalries, and contention over roles and missions. This is not all bad. Healthy competi-

tion over ideas is fundamental to the course of innovation. But the collegiate, joint effort represented in *JV 2010* bodes well for service cooperation within a framework of joint warfighting concepts.

JV 2010 is not so much about technology as it is focused on developing new operational capabilities. The new capabilities embrace every aspect of warfighting including quality people, leading edge technology, integrated training and doctrine, superior equipment and weapons systems, and more.

Three important benefits will emerge from *JV 2010* and the process that flows from it.

First, it will foster continued cooperation among all DOD components in working toward a common set of joint warfighting capabilities in two critical ways. It will serve as a litmus test for evaluating future service and CINC initiatives. The services will be the prime movers in over-the-horizon thinking and restructuring, and CINCs will be the prime movers in testing and validating concepts and technologies. *JV 2010* will also provide a benchmark for evaluating changes into the 21st century. It will help us harness the best efforts and keep us focused on joint capabilities, not business as usual or divergent priorities.

Once implemented, *JV 2010* will also enable us to further refine procedures for assessing and developing joint capabilities. It will provide a

bridge between such critical efforts as the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments (JWCA), and the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review by offering a common benchmark against which to measure all options under consideration. While these individual processes currently bring service perspectives into joint focus, *JV 2010* will integrate the efforts of all processes. The result will be more efficient use of resources and a better return on our investment.

The second benefit is that *JV 2010* will enable us to leverage every opportunity that presents itself during this period of rapid change. Knowing the types of capabilities we desire, it will permit us to transform emerging technologies into advantages that support our vision. Today, for example, we are in the midst of a revolution in military affairs. Rapid technological changes must and will force changes in organization, training, and operations. If there is one certainty, it is that the revolution will cause us to either maintain our edge or lose it. *JV 2010* is designed to help us retain it.

The final benefit of *JV 2010* is that it will allow us to achieve higher levels of jointness. We will always fight jointly, and despite tremendous progress over the last several years we must continuously refine our warfighting capabilities.

Various joint efforts are underway, such as enhancing the joint lessons learned process and developing joint doctrine and training. These efforts will continue and I expect that *JV 2010* and the plans that result from it will accelerate them. *JV 2010* will also bring a greater level of jointness to every facet of warfighting by ensuring that current and future development efforts contribute to desired joint capabilities. We will capitalize on the experience of the Joint Warfighting Center as it plays a central role in implementing *JV 2010*.

We now enjoy the advantage of having the world's finest military. That fact is not chiseled in stone. Maintaining our status as a preeminent power will demand work, particularly at a time of unprecedented change. We will have to be united and flexible as we move into the next century.

JV 2010 will help us negotiate the changes ahead, leverage new opportunities, and maintain our standing as the finest fighting force in the world, capable of deterring war or winning a conflict if called upon to fight. We will maintain a force with the capability to deploy to a theater on short notice, ready to fight and win as a joint team.

JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

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